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Within the tradition of U.S. journalism, “muckraking” refers to reform-oriented 
investigative reporting undertaken to provoke public outcry and to promote 
institutional change. Although the decline of newspapers has reduced the resources 
available for certain kinds of investigative reporting, muckraking is still a common 
practice, and it can be found today in the calls for greater transparency that have 
accompanied the rise of the internet and the spread of digital information. In this 
article, I first outline a contemporary technology-driven vision of openness and 
access that appears to be global. I then consider how this new form of muckraking 
affects the United States Supreme Court and judicial legitimacy in the United 
States. 
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Resumen 
En la tradición periodística de Estados Unidos, la “prensa sensacionalista” se refiere 
al periodismo de investigación que busca provocar la protesta pública y promover el 
cambio institucional. El descenso de los periódicos ha reducido los recursos para el 
periodismo de investigación, pero la publicación de escándalos sigue siendo una 
práctica común, presente en los llamamientos actuales a una mayor transparencia 
que han venido de la mano del auge de Internet y la difusión de la información 
digital. Este artículo en primer lugar realiza una aproximación a la visión 
contemporánea de apertura y acceso que ha traído consigo la tecnología, y que 
parece ser global. A continuación analiza de qué forma esta forma de periodismo de 
investigación afecta a la Corte Suprema y la legitimidad judicial en los EE UU. 
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1. Introduction 
Within the United States, the history of investigative journalism effectively began 
with muckraking, an early 20th century brand of reform-oriented reporting 
dedicated to exposing corruption and to provoking change (Filler 1961, Leonard 
1986, Tichi 2004). In recent decades, the decline of print journalism and the re-
shuffling of the news industry has weakened some aspects of the muckraking 
tradition in the United States (Flood 2009). Even so, the muckraking impulse is still 
very much alive in the push for greater transparency that has come with the rise of 
the internet and the spread of digital information. In this article, my goal is to 
examine how contemporary technology-driven muckraking is likely to affect the 
United States Supreme Court and judicial legitimacy. 
I begin by surveying the context of digital information in which the Court now 
operates. As Bradley Manning belatedly and tragically encountered, the 
extraordinary fluidity of information today can have broad consequences for how 
public life is conducted and for how citizens relate to their governments (Savage 
2013). Many figures have embraced the radical potential of digital information and 
have forecast a coming era of total transparency and deep democratic engagement 
(Greenberg 2012). I suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court has understandably been 
reluctant to heed these internet-fueled calls for openness because such calls are 
embedded in a political vision antithetical to the way in which the Court currently 
functions. It is not difficult to see why the justices might be concerned about the 
destabilizing effects that many believe the new era of ubiquitous, highly 
transmissible information will ultimately bring.  
Nonetheless, I think that the U.S. Supreme Court actually has little to fear from 
digital information and the muckraking exposés that it promises. As I explain in the 
second part of this article, the greatest potential delegitimizing factor for the Court 
is the perception that the justices render their decisions on the basis of personal 
partisan preference rather than on the basis of legal principle and impartial reason. 
I argue that the distribution of more information will not create a political 
perception of the Court because such a perception is already quite common in the 
United States. Large majorities of Americans already believe that the justices 
decide cases on political grounds, and this belief co-exists with a generally held 
belief that the Court is an impartial arbiter of law. In short, there is no hidden truth 
for muckraking journalists to unearth for the notion that the justices are influenced 
by partisanship is an open secret. 
In the final section of the article, I consider the factors that sustain this open 
secret. I argue that the Court carries on amid widespread suspicion because public 
skepticism about the judiciary is not tied to a public desire to debunk and reform. 
Evangelists of digital information often suppose that evidence of a conflict between 
what officials say and what they do will lead necessarily lead to a reckoning, with a 
newly informed public taking back the power that has been misused by institutions. 
I suggest that this assumption does not apply to the contemporary American 
judicial process—a context in which a suite of interests, habits, and affections keep 
people invested in the status quo. 
2. The Court and open-source politics 
The world is awash in information. By 2002, the amount of digitally recorded 
information matched the amount of analog recorded information for the first time in 
history; five years later, digital information accounted for 94% of all the recorded 
information on the planet (Greenberg 2012, p. 5). The immense and rapidly 
growing body of digital data is distinguished by one dominant characteristic: 
liquidity. “[I]nfinitely reproducible, frictionlessly mobile” digital information flows far 
more quickly and continuously than its analog predecessor ever could (Greenberg 
2012, p. 5). 
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The bonanza of highly fluid digital information makes it easier than ever to publicize 
and distribute the work of governmental institutions like the United States Supreme 
Court. For example, SCOTUSblog provides comprehensive coverage of the Court’s 
docket, broadly disseminating information that was once known only to a small 
circle of dedicated Court watchers (Scotusblog 2014). In addition, the Oyez Project 
maintains a multimedia archive with over 7,000 hours of U.S. Supreme Court 
audio, giving the public free access to oral arguments without requiring a journey to 
the Court to watch the live proceedings or a trip to Washington, D.C. to listen to 
recordings (Oyez Project 2011). Another way to access Court-related information is 
by visiting the Legal Information Institute, which houses a sprawling virtual 
repository that contains every Court opinion produced since 1992 and over 600 
historically significant Court decisions (Cornell Law School, Legal Information 
Institute n.d.). 
The glut of easily obtainable information has spawned demands in the United States 
for ever greater transparency from its highest court. Support for such demands is 
easy to find—except on the Supreme Court itself, where the justices have practiced 
a kind of passive aggressive resistance. The Court records oral arguments, for 
example, but it does not allow the audio to be broadcast live as oral arguments 
occur (Denniston 2012). Instead, the Court usually waits until the end of the term 
to make the recordings publically available. In only the most exceptional 
circumstances the Court will release recordings at the end of the day or week when 
a given argument occurs. The Court also maintains a website where it typically 
posts opinions within a few minutes of their release from the bench (Supreme Court 
of the United States 2014). But the site is not configured to handle the heaviest 
traffic and when requests have been made to supplement the site (for example, by 
emailing the text of the opinion to the press in addition to posting it to the site), the 
Court has declined to act (Goldstein 2012). 
At other times, the Court has actively sought to suppress open communication 
about its work. For years, the Court allowed access to oral argument audio 
recordings solely for purposes of private education and research (Oyez Project 
2011). Chief Justice Warren Burger originally imposed the restrictions in response 
to CBS News’ broadcast of the Pentagon Papers’ recorded oral arguments (New 
York Times v. United States 1971). The Chief Justice’s decision was clearly intended 
to prevent broad dissemination of the audio recordings. Indeed, Burger went so far 
as to request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation determine how CBS News 
obtained the tapes (Irons 2005). 
In another matter involving recorded oral arguments, the Court even threatened to 
pursue punitive legal action. Peter Irons, a professor at the University of California, 
San Diego, edited portions of twenty-three historic oral argument recordings and 
packaged them for sale (Irons and Guitton 1993). Although Irons had clearly 
violated the conditions governing the recordings’ use, the Court attracted criticism 
for threatening to sue Irons and for taking a stand against the circulation of its 
work (New York Times 1993). It was only after a public outcry that the Court 
removed the restrictions limiting the use of audiotapes to research and education 
(Greenhouse 1993).  
The Court has also banned cameras in its courtroom—and unlike the case of audio 
recordings, criticism has not yet overcome the Court’s active opposition to public 
access on this front. The justices argue that video broadcasts will not only 
misinform the public by leading viewers to focus on dramatic moments, but also 
distort the judicial process by encouraging participants to play to the cameras 
(Marder 2012). Thus the justices suggest that cameras in the Court will erode 
judicial independence and legitimacy. Advocates of video counter the justices by 
arguing that television broadcasts and live streaming will educate the public and 
hold the judiciary accountable (Marder 2012). Advocates also complain that the 
justices are being too thin-skinned and are simply afraid that widely distributed 
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video recordings might be used to make them look silly (Liptak 2011)—a complaint 
that gains force when one considers that many of the justices readily appear in 
public when given a chance to address specific audiences that they wish reach 
(Baum 2006, Baum and Devins 2010).  
The charge of over-sensitivity has done little to soften the lines of disagreement. In 
fact, there is some indication that positions have hardened even further. After 
expressing support for courtroom cameras during her confirmation hearings in 
2009, Justice Sotomayor reversed herself in 2013. “Every Supreme Court decision,” 
Sotomayor said, “is rendered with a [written] majority opinion that goes carefully 
through the analysis of the case and why the end result was reached. Everyone 
fully explains their views” (Teicher 2013). According to Sotomayor, such detailed 
explanations of judicial decisions are not to be found during the oral arguments 
conducted in open court. Rather than being devoted to explication, oral argument is 
designed to be a “forum in which the judge plays devil's advocate with lawyers” 
(Teicher 2013). The broadcast of oral arguments would therefore be “more 
misleading than helpful” because viewers would be encouraged to seek reasoned 
justifications in a context where the justices are only concerned with “probing all 
the arguments” (Teicher 2013). With Sotomayor’s change of heart, it is fair to say 
that cameras will not be arriving at the high court any time soon.  
Why have the members of the Court dug in their heels? One might argue that the 
justices have mistakenly opposed more exposure because they fail to appreciate 
the degree to which journalists covering the Court are supportive of the institution. 
After all, the history of Court coverage has generally been written by a dedicated 
Supreme Court press corps that avoids critical reporting in order to preserve its 
working relationships with the justices (Davis 2011).  
The difficulty with projecting from past practice is that we live in a time when 
reporting and newsgathering can no longer be easily limited to a select corps of 
journalists and their chosen subjects. Digital information is easy to duplicate and 
distribute; as a result, it can readily be placed in the hands of ordinary people and 
used as a check on the abuse of power. This checking function is not, however, 
merely a matter of identifying and disciplining a few bad actors. As Julian Assange 
has argued, widely disseminated information may not only shine a bright light on 
individual corporate leaders and public officials using their positions to enrich 
themselves illegally, but also reveal the wrongdoing that routinely emerges from 
standard operating procedures among elites. The target is all “the regular decision-
making that turns a blind eye to and supports unethical practices,” including the 
“oversight not done, the priorities of executives [and] how they think they’re 
fulfilling their own self-interest” (Greenberg 2102, p. 2). The widespread use of 
digital information will inevitably allow all decisions at every level to be continuously 
examined and corrected.  
Assange’s conception of complete transparency and endless scrutiny has generated 
friction with the mainstream news media (Keller 2011). Yet, in articulating his 
transformative vision, Assange harkened back to the news media’s own historical 
roots by clothing the old promise of muckraking journalism in new garb. 
Muckraking, as Filler noted, “was concerned with the criticism and revaluation of 
every aspect of national life. The crusaders denounced rascality in government just 
as bitterly as they denounced it in corporation” (Filler 1961, p. 56, emphasis 
original). Assange stands in the same tradition. The revival of this old notion of 
relentless exposé, now powered by vast reservoirs of digital information, is bound 
to be seen as threatening by members of the Court. 
We can get a clearer sense of the potential threat by envisioning the muckraking 
possibilities of digital information in its ultimate form: the deconstruction of existing 
schemes of decision-making and the founding of a new kind of self-governance. 
Advocates call this ultimate vision “open-source politics” (Kron 2012). The term 
borrows from the field of software design: open-source computer programming 
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allows an entire community of engineers to access a program’s entire source code 
at all times—a method of software development that allows cooperation on a single 
project without centralized coordination (Shirky 2012). 
The broad and continuous circulation of digital information permits the logic of 
open-source programming to be applied to politics. Ordinary people one day may 
be given access to all of the materials necessary for governance all of the time. In 
such a context, government will be completely open to the citizenry, with all official 
actions totally transparent and fully communicated. Moreover, the public will 
directly exercise power because policy will take its shape and direction from “non-
moderated, self-organized” discussion and participation (Nitsche 2013). The 
beginning of such activity is already present in the way a significant of population of 
“participatory new consumers” use social media to filter, assess, and comment on 
news reports (Purcell et al. 2010). Open-source advocates push even further, 
insisting that the final aim of cooperation-without-coordination is to achieve 
digitally-enabled pure democracy. In this future world, whistleblowers will easily 
and regularly leak sensitive documents and information to the public (Piraten Partei 
2012). More importantly, the people themselves will actively gather and 
disseminate vast amounts of information, and they will also actively expose, 
critique, and judge official actions (Shirky 2012). In this way, the public will capture 
control of the government and “create a transparent society by force” (Greenberg 
2012, p. 317). 
If we think of the U.S. Supreme Court as institution reliant on popular support in 
the same way that elected officials are (Bassok 2013), then the prospect of 
subjecting the justices to continuous, thoroughly democratic scrutiny may be a 
welcome one. Yet, whatever the role of popular support may be, it remains the 
case that the Court does not hold itself out as being directly dependent on the 
public and this creates real tensions with the notion of a newly empowered people.  
For example, the open-source ideal is clearly at odds with the Court’s current 
structure and function. It is true, of course, that the Court already performs many 
of its tasks in the open. Oral argument is a public event (Supreme Court of the 
United States 2013c) and the Court’s decisions are all published as public 
documents (Supreme Court of the United States 2013a). But the Court is otherwise 
quite secretive. The weekly conference where justices discuss cases and cast their 
preliminary votes is closed to all but the justices themselves (Supreme Court of the 
United States 2013c). Although an occasional exposé of the Court’s internal 
dynamics appears in the media (Crawford 2012), the interactions between the 
justices, their clerks, and the staff are usually kept strictly confidential.  
Moreover, the Court is insulated from the public by design. Once justices have been 
confirmed, they hold their positions “during good behavior,” a term that effectively 
ensures life tenure on the bench (Constitution of the United States, Article III, § 1). 
As I suggested above, this is not to say that the Court is completely unconnected 
from public opinion. Scholars have long argued that the justices must take popular 
views into account to ensure that their authority is respected and their rulings are 
implemented (McCloskey 1960, Bassok 2013). Even so, the Court is clearly the 
least democratic institution in the federal government and, according to the 
Framers, it was precisely this distance from the public that provided “the best 
expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and 
impartial administration of the laws” (Hamilton 1961, p. 469). 
The Court is also embedded within a hierarchical judicial bureaucracy and sits atop 
a large network of inferior courts that it reviews and directs (United States Courts 
n.d.). The justices exercise near total control of their own docket, and they largely 
make the final determination of which cases to hear and what questions to address 
(Supreme Court of the United States 2013b). In this sense, the Court is a very long 
way away from the historical examples of ancient courts that allowed the litigants 
themselves to select the law that would govern their case as well as the judge who 
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would hear their arguments (Shapiro 1986). While the Court relies on litigants to 
bring cases, the Court does not exist only to resolve individual litigant disputes. The 
Court governs the legal system though its opinions, and in deciding cases the 
justices often use a specific conflict to establish broad policies that go well beyond 
the particular interests of the contending parties. For this reason, some 
commentators suggest that the Court is less a judicial body concerned with 
individual-level dispute management than a ministry of justice concerned with 
system-level control (Post 2001, Bybee and Narasimhan 2013). This is a far cry 
from open-source principles and members of the Court understandably resist 
innovations that could create entirely transparent, highly participatory, and non-
hierarchical forms of politics. 
3. Open secrets 
To say the radical democratic potential of digital information is antithetical to the 
Court is not to say that the Court actually has anything to worry about. To be sure, 
the complete realization of the open-source ideal would fundamentally alter politics 
and society. But the ultimate fulfillment of open-source goals is not imminent, and 
for the foreseeable future, the Court is quite likely to weather the rising tides of 
liquid information. This is because the muckraking and checking functions of digital 
information put society on the road to open-source politics only if the exposure of 
government action leads to popular protest and reform. In fact, exposure does not 
always trigger such a public response (some of the original muckrakers came to 
realize this fact themselves—Grenier 1983). 
As Evgeny Morozov notes, “Information can embarrass governments but you have 
to look at the nature of governments as well as the nature of information to 
measure this embarrassment factor” (Greenberg 2012, p. 268). In many societies, 
corruption is an open secret, already known to everyone. In such circumstances, 
publicity does not initiate a cycle of dissent and change. “Just go and take photos of 
their villas and summer houses they buy with their state salaries. It’s already in the 
open, but exposure by itself in these countries doesn’t lead to democratic change” 
(Greenberg 2012, p. 268).  
The Court is in a similar position. Consider that the Court has long been subject to 
criticism that it decides cases on the basis of something other than the facts, law, 
and arguments in the dispute at hand. At the time of the Founding itself the Anti-
Federalists argued against the ratification of the Constitution because Supreme 
Court justices would inevitably rule on the basis of their personal political 
preferences: “[I]ndependent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power 
under heaven,” the justices were ultimately bound to “feel themselves independent 
of heaven itself” (Brutus 1985, p. 183). The Anti-Federalist critique undercuts the 
core justification for the Court’s authority, turning the very independence that 
permits the Court to be impartial into a reason to distrust judicial power. Rather 
than being exemplars of principle and restraint, the justices exploit vast 
opportunities to pursue their own interests under the guise of unbiased 
adjudication. 
One might imagine that the broad circulation of information demonstrating 
politically motivated decision-making by the Court would re-animate Anti-Federalist 
concerns, provoking criticism and calls for change. If true, then the age of free-
flowing digital information would be bound to create an age of judicial crisis and 
transformation. Yet this is not the case because the belief that the Court operates 
on the basis of personal preference is already widespread. There is no need to wait 
for muckraking investigations by crusading citizens or journalists because the 
politics of Court decision-making is an open secret that everybody already knows. 
Evidence of this open secret often surfaces in elite discourse. The debate over 
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen’s recent criticism of constitutional law provides an 
illustration. Paulsen, who is himself the co-author of a constitutional law casebook 
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(Paulsen et al. 2010), argued that constitutional law should be removed from the 
required law school curriculum in the United States because the subject is so 
saturated with politics that it “teaches bad habits” (Paulsen 2012). As articulated by 
the Court in its decisions, constitutional law teaches students that “any answer is as 
good as any other, that there [are] a variety of interpretive approaches from which 
to choose, and that you should argue from your preferred approach in order to 
reach your preferred result” (Paulsen 2012). Thus, according to Paulsen, 
constitutional law does not belong among other mandatory law school courses 
because it is thoroughly and inherently political. 
Rather than decry Paulsen’s claims, the professors responding to his critique agreed 
that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is essentially a political enterprise (Lund 
2012, Levinson 2012). At the same time, the professors debating Paulsen also 
insisted that constitutional law remains law. Judicial reasoning is results-oriented, 
and it is also the authoritative language of the courts. Mastery of this forked tongue 
“is among the most important skills that competent practicing lawyers must 
acquire” (Lund 2012). “We are training lawyers, and, whether we like it or not, it is 
the essential job of the lawyer to manufacture non-frivolous arguments, whether 
sincerely believed or not, that are designed to serve the interests of a client” 
(Levinson 2012, emphasis original). To Paulsen’s respondents, the undeniable fact 
of the matter is that constitutional law cannot be purged of either law or politics; it 
is simultaneously practiced as both.  
Given the long history of academic literature portraying the Court as a political 
actor (Bybee 2011a), one might expect professors to be unfazed by the assertion 
that constitutional law is shaped by partisanship and preference. Yet the news 
media also shares this understanding of the Court. For example, coverage of 
Supreme Court nominations regularly portrays judicial decision-making as a 
political activity driven by partisan preference (Bybee 2011b). Such political 
renderings in news reports frequently co-exist with conventional presentations of 
judicial decision-making as a principled activity, a matter of conscientiously seeking 
criteria of judgment beyond the dictates of partisan policymaking. In this vein, 
Elena Kagan’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee during her 
confirmation hearings was simultaneously reported as a reasoned and impartial 
elaboration of a jurisprudential approach and as a tightly scripted performance by a 
self-interested nominee bent on hiding the true sources of her legal views (Bybee 
2011b). The thought that justices may espouse principle and follow preference at 
the same time seems to be no more surprising to journalists than it is to law 
professors. 
This split-level understanding of the high bench is hardly limited to elites. The 
public at-large also holds a political view of the Court, and this political view exists 
alongside a widespread belief that the Court is a trusted and fair arbiter. Consider 
the public perceptions of the Supreme Court’s healthcare reform decision, National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012). Before the Court rendered 
its landmark decision, there was general speculation that the five conservative 
justices might vote to strike down all or part of the Affordable Care Act, while the 
four liberal justices would vote to uphold (Katyal 2012). The anticipated split 
mapped perfectly onto the positions staked out by the political parties, fueling great 
public discussion about the influence of political factors on judicial decision-making 
(Klein 2012). Such political perceptions of the Court were clearly reflected in public 
opinion polls, with surveys showing the Court’s approval rating reaching a new low 
(Liptak and Kopicki 2012a), and over half of Americans expecting the justices to 
base their healthcare ruling on something other than legal analysis (Barnes and 
Clement 2012, New York Times/CBS News 2012a). At the same time, there was 
also clear evidence that the public did not view the Court solely as a political 
institution. Roughly equal majorities of the healthcare law’s supporters and 
opponents had a favorable view of the Court (Pew Research Center 2012), and the 
Court’s overall approval rating and level of trust remained higher than other 
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national institutions (Liptak and Kopicki 2012a, Newport 2012). It is true that when 
given a choice among a number of factors that might influence the Court’s 
healthcare decision, large numbers of Americans agreed that “national politics,” 
“whether the justices’ themselves hold liberal or conservative views,” and “whether 
a justice was appointed by a Republican or Democratic president” were all likely to 
play a major role as motivating factors (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a). Even so, 
throughout the months leading up to the Court’s decision, the most important 
motivating factor consistently selected by the largest percentage of Americans was 
“the justices’ analysis and interpretation of the law” (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2012a). 
The Court’s actual decision differed from general expectations, with Chief Justice 
John Roberts joining the four liberal justices to uphold virtually all provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act. The Court’s surprise resolution was greeted with largely the 
same mix of public views present during the run-up to the ruling. On one hand, 
political perceptions of the Court were clear: the Court’s approval rating dipped 
slightly lower after issuing its judgment, and a majority of Americans said that the 
Court based its decision on the justices’ personal or political beliefs (Liptak and 
Kopicki 2012b). On the other hand, the public continued to see the Court as 
something other than a political institution: the Court’s overall approval rating still 
remained higher than other national institutions (New York Times/CBS News 
2012b). Further, when given a choice among a number of possible motivating 
factors, Americans continued to believe that the single most important influence on 
the decision was “the justices’ analysis and interpretation of the law” (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2012b). 
The public’s Janus-faced view of the Court’s healthcare reform decision mirrors the 
public’s overall assessment of the Supreme Court, as well as their views of state 
courts and of courts in general (Bybee 2010, Gibson 2012). At every level of the 
court system, large majorities of Americans see political influence at work in judicial 
decision-making, even as they continue to trust the courts and to support their 
independence. Given the disposition of popular perceptions, it strains credulity to 
argue that the onrush of digital information and intensification of scrutiny will 
unmask the Court’s politics. Indeed, rather than wondering how judicial legitimacy 
might survive when liquid information floods into the public sphere and muckraking 
the Supreme Court becomes the order of the day, the better question is how the 
courts manage to maintain legitimacy in the first place when they are widely 
understood to be partisan and impartial at the same time.  
4. Interests, habit, and affection 
The theory behind the muckraking function of digital information is that the public 
will swiftly criticize and correct corrupt behavior once it has been exposed. 
However, in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court, it appears that the public already 
believes that ostensibly illegitimate judicial behavior occurs and nonetheless 
continues to have trust and confidence in the high bench. How is the open secret of 
judicial politics sustained? 
The answer, I would argue, is that a cluster of factors keep ordinary people 
invested in the status quo at every level of the system. These factors function 
largely because of, rather than merely in spite of, the contradictions inherent in the 
hybrid legal-political judicial process (Bybee 2010). Consider first the issue of 
usefulness: one way to think about the tension between the principled explanations 
offered by judges and the political motivations already suspected by the public is to 
say that the tension reflects the utility of a highly procedural legal system. Judicial 
proceedings facilitate engagement and coordination between people who otherwise 
disagree about substantive ends by creating a formal set of procedures that leave 
the roots of conflicts largely untouched. On this view, it is unnecessary for disputing 
parties to personally transform or genuinely reconcile in order to reach a settlement 
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because the judicial process’s goal is not to arrive at an objectively correct or 
perfectly just outcome so much as it is to employ a method for coping with 
conflicts—a way of negotiating limited areas of consensus while allowing great 
regions of disagreement to remain intact. Litigants are neither required to abandon 
their partisan passions at the courthouse door nor asked to realize their significant, 
yet ordinarily unobtainable normative ideals of impartiality and principle. Instead, 
they must only agree to couch their conflict in legal terms.  
The procedural system makes civil peace possible when the cacophony of 
competing claims in the community would otherwise defeat efforts to manage 
conflict. Everyone, including a judge, is given the chance to frame their interests in 
law’s independent tests and doctrines, lending their views an appearance of 
importance and weight that may not have much of a connection to underlying 
substance. The presence of so many poseurs in the system naturally leads the 
public to suspect that the judicial process is subject to instrumental manipulation. 
Yet even though such suspicions chip away at judicial legitimacy, they also point to 
the very mechanism that attracts people to judicial dispute management, for it is 
the possibility of hypocrisy that at once threatens public support for the judiciary 
and makes the courts useful. The system endures not in because it overcomes the 
contradiction between instrumental action and impartial principle, but because it 
relies on this contradiction to suit law to the individuals which it governs. In other 
words, it is because individuals simultaneously wish to preserve their own particular 
interests and to feel they are living up to impersonal standards that the judicial 
process operates on two conflicting planes at once. 
Apart from the interests in dispute management and principled appearances that 
generally attract people to law, a broad law-sustaining habit can also be found 
within the larger community. H.L.A. Hart called it the “habit of obedience”—a 
general disposition to follow law that manifests itself in daily behavior (Hart 1994, 
p. 24). The habit is a reflexive response that can take the form of “unreflective, 
effortless, engrained” compliance when legal dictates are easy to follow, as in the 
case of automatically and unthinkingly driving on the right side of the road (Hart 
1994, p. 52). The habit is also a routine behavior in areas of life where the 
demands of law are more exacting and following the rules “runs counter to strong 
inclinations” (Hart 1994, p. 52). When it comes to paying taxes, for example, the 
habit of obedience exerts influence and the fact of compliance “for some 
considerable time past” makes it likely that people will continue to comply in the 
future (Hart 1994, p. 52). 
As Hart noted, the habit of obedience requires “no general conception of the legal 
structure or of its criteria of validity” (Hart 1994, p. 114). Most people are inclined 
to follow law either out of deference to the way in which things have always been 
done or out of fear of being punished should they disobey. Thus the habit of 
obedience is suited to the discordant amalgam of principles and passions within 
each of us. It breeds attachment to the legal system by relying on the ease of 
inertia and the interest in avoiding penalty, all without requiring individuals to be 
persuaded by rational argument, to embody the normative ideals expressed in legal 
rules, or to possess much legal knowledge. 
Pleasure also bolsters the judicial process. The reliance on pleasure may be 
somewhat difficult to see, since the judicial process looks like an unlikely place to 
find any kind of contentment or delight. Indeed, legal procedures are often formal 
and boring, and this appears to be so on purpose. The dullness of law serves the 
goal of dispute management, helping to create a procedural rendering of events 
that is more tractable than the messy particulars of actual experience. And yet, law 
does have its pleasurable features.  
To begin with, law creates a kind of sanctuary in which the brutalities of a dispute 
may be given a stylized and intellectually refined gloss, the very legal procedures 
that induce boredom may also foster an appealing sense of shelter and relief 
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(Posner 1993). Pleasure is also found in the way legal procedures assign and 
confirm status, conveying a public message about individual worth through the 
manner in which disputing parties are treated (Tyler 1990, Tyler and Hou 2002). 
When the judicial process deals with litigants in a way that appears to be “polite, 
respectful, and unbiased,” then people are more likely to accept judicial decisions 
and rate the legal system positively, regardless of how their case is finally resolved 
(Tyler and Hou 2002, p. 12). To demonstrate solicitude for complaints and to allow 
individuals to relate their side of the story is to treat people as rights-bearing 
subjects that deserve to be valued. This legal showing of respect does not change 
the fact that one party in a dispute may end up getting the better of the other, any 
more than polite flattery increases the actual beauty of a person’s appearance or 
the true stature of his achievements. In both cases, the pleasure is in how things 
are said and how affairs are conducted, not in the ultimate outcome or in any 
concrete change in underlying conditions. 
The judicial process is also sustained by the need to maintain power. As a matter of 
historical fact, law has frequently been used to shore up hierarchies (Bybee 2010). 
In the United States, law and the courts have been used to solidify and maintain 
the subordination of women, the domination of African Americans, and the 
marginalization of the LGBT community, to name only a few examples. Powerful 
groups are clearly drawn to the legal system as a stable means of securing their 
position. Yet weaker groups also find reason to support the prevailing order 
because there is more than one way to seek advantages from the judicial process.  
Most ordinary individuals have only “occasional recourse to the courts” and are 
invested in the outcome of their particular case (Galanter 1974, p. 97, Albiston 
1999). For such one-time litigants, the only result that matters is the disposition of 
the dispute in which they are involved. By contrast, repeat players, with multiple 
and ongoing engagements in the judicial process, have smaller stakes in specific 
outcomes; they use their resources to manage their disputes with an eye toward 
influencing the rules of the legal game that will govern litigation in the future. 
Repeat players are consequently willing to settle when it makes strategic sense to 
do so, taking a loss in a specific case for the sake of preserving favorable rules in 
an entire run of cases. The individual, one-time litigant facing an organized, well-
resourced repeat player may aggressively push for a preferred outcome and 
manage to claim the pleasure of winning her case. At the level of the specific 
dispute, such a result lends law “a flavor of equality,” suggesting that differences in 
position between the two parties do not determine judicial decisions (Galanter 
1974, p. 135). The resource differences are nonetheless reflected at the level of 
legal rules where the wise management of victories and defeats permits repeat 
players to structure the overall system to their advantage. Two different senses of 
“good enough” settlements and two different kinds of winning are thus in play. The 
legal system may widely distribute acceptable results and feelings of victory, all the 
while ensuring that individual winners do not threaten the position of those 
organized, powerful groups with the wherewithal to shape their litigation with an 
eye toward the long term. 
Beyond the differential distribution of victory, the judicial process also serves the 
powerful without entirely alienating the powerless by strategically deploying broad 
assurances of fairness. Equal treatment is guaranteed to all, but only in a 
formalized and individualized fashion that favors specific groups (Haltom and 
McCann 2004). The result is a legal system that maintains an air of universal 
benefit even as it systematically advances the interests of the few. 
5. Conclusion 
There is much more to be said about the role of interest, habit, and pleasure in 
sustaining public faith in the judicial process and the rule of law (for example, 
Bybee 2010). The account of these sustaining factors offered here is not designed 
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to paint a complete picture, but to suggest why more publicity about the politics of 
judicial decision-making is unlikely to destabilize popular opinion. As I have argued, 
a large majority of the public already thinks of the United States Supreme Court as 
a hybrid body: an institution that simultaneously engages in politics and law as it 
conducts its business of dispute management. Most people do not have a sense of 
appropriate judicial action that is violated by news about partisan preferences and 
political considerations on the high bench. Contrary to the claims of advocates of 
open-source democracy (and to the claims of their muckraking antecedents), 
greater transparency and communication about judicial decision-making is more 
likely to confirm than to disrupt the public’s contradictory perceptions of the 
judiciary. Members of the Supreme Court should realize that when secrets are 
open, public exposure is not a radical act. 
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